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Chapter 6
Boot with Integrity, or  
Don’t Boot
You can’t build a great building on a weak foundation. You must have  
a solid foundation if you’re going to have a strong superstructure.
—Gordon B. Hinckley
You are on a business trip and staying in a nice hotel. You leave your laptop in the room 
while going out for a dinner appointment. The laptop has its full disk-encryption feature 
enabled. Being reasonably paranoid, you even turned off the laptop. You believe that 
the laptop and your confidential files stored in it are safe and secure. However, that 
may not be true. An “evil maid” who can physically access the laptop on the sly for 
just two minutes may be able to steal your drive encryption password without a trace. 
Consequently, the confidentiality of all encrypted data on the laptop is in danger.
How does the evil maid do it? The trick is the boot process. End-to-end security is 
essential. The boot security is as critical as, if not more critical than, runtime security.
For the past decade, the effort of securing computers has been focused largely on 
mitigating runtime threats. Numerous solutions have been developed to safeguard the 
integrity of computer systems and protect users’ assets. These solutions include but 
are not limited to antivirus, network firewalls, and password managers. Some of these 
solutions are software-based; others are either dedicated hardware devices or hybrid 
designs made up of software and hardware. Most of these solutions mean to thwart 
certain types of security threats at runtime of the system. Drive encryption programs 
including TrueCrypt, PGP, and BitLocker) adopt a preboot authentication that is 
launched during the boot process as an extension of the BIOS before the operating system 
(such as Windows, Linux, Android, iOS, and so forth) is loaded.
The problem is the lack of end-to-end protection. Most software solutions are 
available only after being loaded by the operating system. In other words, during the boot 
process—that is, from the moment a user presses the power button to when the operating 
system takes control and finishes loading the security solutions—the computer is not 
benefiting from the services offered by the security measures and is hence vulnerable. 
Drive encryption schemes that start during the boot do not depend on the operating 
system to function, but they do rely on the integrity of the boot loader that loads them.
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Admittedly, runtime protection is pivotal. The amount of time a computer typically 
spends on boot today is fairly small compared to how long the operating system is 
running. Operating systems have extensive interfaces and connectivity that make the 
attack surface wide and open. In contrast, the boot is a relatively short and contained 
process. As a result, attacks against the boot are more difficult to mount and succeed.
But a building is only as strong as its foundation. Hacking a computer’s boot loader  
is similar to replacing a mansion’s concrete foundation with sand. The components  
that are involved in the boot process comprise the root of trust for the entire system.  
A compromised boot loader renders the operating system—and all programs running on 
it—untrustworthy, including the antivirus, firewalls, and even drive encryption utilities.
Boot Attack
The boot process and components participating in the process vary, depending on the 
architecture of the system. How a computer boots today is significantly different and 
more complex than it was a decade ago. At a high level, most computers follow the boot 
sequence shown in Figure 6-1.
Figure 6-1. Boot flow
The BIOS (basic input/output system) is a firmware component stored in nonvolatile 
memory, usually a flash chip. The BIOS loads the boot loader, which is the first software 
component loaded during the boot process. The boot loader is stored in the hard drive, 
together with the operating system and applications.
For attackers, it is preferable to compromise a component that is loaded earlier 
than one loaded later, because taking control at an early stage enables control over all 
subsequent components. Successful attacks against user-mode software programs may 
not be glorious accomplishments in the security community nowadays. Instead, the BIOS 
and boot loader are becoming more interesting targets. A number of such attacks were 
published in the recent years. Here are two examples:
•	 Attacking BIOS: This type of attack replaces an authentic BIOS 
with an attacker’s BIOS that contains malicious code. There have 
been attacks against the UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware 
Interface) secure boot.
•	 Attacking boot loader: This type of attack usually installs a boot 
kit (a variant of root kits that runs in the kernel mode) under an 
attacker’s control that infects the boot loader. The boot kit can be 
used to steal secrets during the boot path; for example, logging 
the user’s drive encryption password.
If an adversary manages to modify the BIOS or boot loader code without 
authorization, then a straightforward damage he can realize is to corrupt the BIOS or boot 
loader and render the computer unbootable and inoperable (this category of attack is 
called bricking). The most famous example of this kind is the CIH virus, which resulted 
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in reportedly millions of computers failing to boot in the late 1990s. The CIH virus, 
named after its author Chen Ing-Hau, a student at Taiwan’s Tatung University, flashes 
and rewrites the BIOS region with junk so the infected computers can no longer start. 
Generally speaking, bricking the attacker’s own device yields no benefits to the attacker. 
But if such bricking attacks can be mounted remotely and widely spread with viruses like 
CIH, it will cause substantial monetary loss.
In today’s operating system, writing to flash or a boot loader without physical access 
is an incredibly privileged operation and hence more difficult to implement than 20 years 
ago. The bricking attacks against the boot path cause little or no harm on newer computers 
that are shipped with backup BIOS images on the flash and recoverable boot loaders on 
a special region of the hard drive or from the manufacturer-provided recovery disc. Most 
reputable antivirus utilities are capable of monitoring the integrity of the boot loader and 
of killing viruses that infect the boot loader. Pure bricking attacks against the boot path are 
considered out of scope in the remainder of this chapter.
Evil Maid
Joanna Rutkowska of the Invisible Things Lab was the first to describe the “Evil Maid” 
attack1 in October 2009. In the Evil Maid attack, the maid attacker boots the victim’s 
unattended laptop with her USB stick, which contains a bootable and stripped Linux 
operating system. The USB stick then uses the POSIX command dd to install a malicious 
boot kit, which changes the legitimate boot loader with a hook for recognizing and 
recording the full drive encryption passphrase later when the victim turns on his laptop 
and types in the passphrase on the keyboard. The malicious boot kit also recalculates 
certain fields of the MBR (master boot record), including the boot loader hash and size, 
in order to make it look like a legitimate MBR. The recorded passphrase is stored on the 
hard drive and it can be sent over the network to the attacker, or simply be retrieved by 
the evil maid the next day, when she can access the laptop and boot to her USB stick 
again. Once the encryption passphrase is acquired, the maid can just clone the victim’s 
encrypted drive so she can steal all data on it.
Notice that the Evil Maid attack works only on a laptop that is turned off, because the 
attack takes advantage of the lack of boot integrity protection, and the drive encryption 
passphrase is entered by the user only during boot. If the maid deliberately turned off a 
sleeping or hibernating computer in order to mount her attack, then the victim would 
notice that something was wrong and suspect that someone had done something to his 
laptop. However, why would the victim power off his laptop in the first place, while he is 
going out for just an hour for dinner? The average user may not do so.
As a matter of fact, a paranoid professional user who has heard of the “cold boot” 
attack2 may actually turn off his laptop even if he will be away for a short time. The 
researchers that presented the cold boot attack reports found that, based on experiments, 
the DRAM (dynamic random-access memory) still retains its content within a certain 
amount of time after the power is removed, even at the room temperature. Colder 
environments prolong the duration of the memory remanence. This observation is 
contrary to the popular assumption that DRAM would lose its data almost instantly when 
not being refreshed. The time period for which data resides in DRAM after power removal 
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is generally long enough for an experienced attacker to figure out the drive encryption key 
from the DRAM. To counter such attacks, it is advisable to power down a laptop before 
leaving it unattended.
As you can see from the scenarios of the Evil Maid attack, without boot integrity 
protection, drive encryption techniques are able to safeguard your data only for cases 
where a thief steals and possesses your computer for good and attempts to retrieve 
plaintext data from it. If an attacker can secretly and physically access your computer for 
some period of time without you knowing, and then return it back to you, then the drive 
encryption cannot protect your data. This is not the fault of any specific drive encryption 
solution, but the limitation of the technology defined by its security model. The Evil 
Maid attack is simply out of scope if the user temporarily gives up the physical control of 
his laptop, that is, this scenario is not something that the encryption itself is intended or 
capable to mitigate.
To address this loophole, the security protection must start from the very beginning 
and cover the entire boot process. If the boot path is secured on the platform, then an evil 
maid will not be able to easily alter the MBR, so full drive encryption schemes can survive 
the attack.
BIOS and UEFI
The BIOS is the first piece of firmware that executes upon computer power-on. It is stored 
in nonvolatile memory, such as a flash chip on the motherboard. The fundamental 
functionality of the BIOS firmware is to initialize and self-test low-level hardware 
components of the computer, such as the CPU, keyboard, display, DRAM, and so forth, as 
well as to load the boot loader for the operating system from the hard drive. For a system 
with the security and management engine enabled, the BIOS is also responsible for 
communicating with the engine for basic configuration and reserving a predefined size of 
DRAM for the engine’s dedicated access.
In fact, the BIOS is a standard that defines the platform firmware interface to 
the operating system. The term BIOS also refers to the firmware that implements the 
standard. In recent years, the UEFI standard3 has been replacing the conventional 
BIOS standard, which has several limitations (such as a 16-bit real mode and a 1MB 
addressable memory) that are posing difficulty in meeting the needs of modern 
computers. Like the BIOS, the UEFI specification defines an interface between 
the operating system and the platform firmware, and the interface is designed to 
communicate only necessary information in order for the operating system to start. 
Besides supporting larger memory and a disk boot, the UEFI also introduces useful add-on 
features such as secure boot. Notice that the UEFI is backward-compatible with the BIOS 
standard. In this chapter, the term BIOS refers to the platform firmware that runs at boot, 
which may be either a conventional BIOS or a UEFI-compatible one.
Everything starts with BIOS on a computer, including security. If the BIOS is 
compromised, then all security countermeasures deployed after BIOS are essentially at 
risk. The era of the CIH virus—when a Windows application could program the flash and 
corrupt the BIOS—is long gone. Nevertheless, security researchers have reported BIOS 
alteration attacks using advanced techniques in recent years.
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BIOS Alteration
At the Black Hat Europe conference in 2006, John Heasman presented a rootkit made 
possible by altering BIOS’s ACPI (advanced configuration and power interface) table4 
The rootkit can infect Windows during Windows installation. This attack requires the 
capability of reflashing the flash chip where the BIOS is stored. At the 2009 CanSecWest 
Security conference, Anibal Sacco and Alfredo Ortega demonstrated patching malicious 
code into the decompression routines of the BIOS.5 Similar to Heasman’s finding, 
physical access and reflashing capability is required to mount the attack.
Requiring physical access and reflashing BIOS firmware with an attacker’s 
code significantly limits the value of the proposed attacks, because nowadays, most 
manufacturers do not allow arbitrary programming of the BIOS. When manufacturers 
issue BIOS updates for adding hardware support and fixing bugs, the new BIOS images are 
usually digitally signed with the manufacturer’s private key. Only if the signature checks 
out by the operating system will the BIOS update be scheduled to launch after reboot.
At the Black Hat USA conference in 2009, Rafal Wojtczuk and Alexander Tereshkin 
presented an attack against certain vulnerable BIOS.6 The attack exploits a buffer overflow 
bug in these BIOSes to subvert the integrity protection (digital signature) on the BIOS 
update. The attack is more sophisticated than the ones introduced by Heasman, Sacco, 
and Ortega, because it does not require physical access, making remote and wide 
deployment possible.
Software Replacement
Attacks can be classified into various models according to the intension. With the 
exception of the CIH virus, the attacks discussed so far in this chapter target taking control 
of victims’ computers and stealing secrets or performing other harmful operations.
In other models, however, attackers are playing with and hacking their owner 
devices, in the attempt to achieve certain goals:
•	 Install adversary’s software system on a low-end device: The 
software shipped with low-end hardware by its OEM (original 
equipment manufacturer) may come with limited functionalities. 
It is to the user’s interest to replace the original software stack 
with unauthorized software, where more powerful functionalities 
are available; for example, installing Android on a GPS (Global 
Positioning System) or media player device. Notice that the low-end  
device may not be equipped with premium hardware features, 
which limits what the adversary’s software is able to accomplish.
•	 Install adversary’s software system on a high-end device: The high-end  
device features hardware capabilities to support premium 
functionalities, such as enhanced high-definition movie playback, 
near field communication (NFC), and so forth. The adversary’s 
software can bypass certain restrictions. For example, content 
protection may be deployed by an OEM’s software to enforce a 
movie rental period. The adversary’s software may remove such 
policy so that the user can own the movie permanently.
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Jailbreaking
Jailbreaking or rooting refers to the action of overcoming certain restrictions of the 
firmware and software stack that are installed on the device by the device OEM or carrier 
(in the case of a smartphone). Essentially, jailbreaking is a form of privilege escalation 
that allows the user to gain the root privilege and full control of his device.
It is common practice for OEMs and wireless carriers to implement restrictions in the 
firmware and software that is shipped with the hardware. There are a number of reasons 
for this practice. For example, here are a few:
Selling applications and additional services to users after they •	
purchase the device
Protecting the device from malware and viruses•	
Promoting the OEM’s software products by preinstalling and •	
locking them down in the operating system
Preventing the wireless device under service contract from being •	
used with other carriers
Collecting usage data from wireless subscribers•	
Jailbreaking would invalidate all aforementioned purposes; hence it is against the 
OEM and carrier’s interest. For example, a jailbroken iPhone or iPad may be able to run 
third-party applications that are not authorized by or purchased from the official Apple 
App Store. It is also possible to jailbreak a smartphone, unlock premium services, and 
enjoy them for free, while the carrier intended to collect extra charges for these services. 
For example, tethering or Hotspot is usually a paid function charged by the amount of 
4G data shared between the smartphone and other non-4G platforms, such as a laptop. 
Software of a jailbroken phone may cheat the carrier by reporting tethering or Hotspot 
traffic as regular 4G data, hence avoiding extra charges.
Besides circumventing restrictions in the existing firmware and software stack, a 
more sophisticated form of jailbreaking is to install a completely different software system 
and possibly repurpose the device. This is especially interesting for devices that are 
equipped with powerful hardware capabilities but limited software functionalities. HP’s 
TouchPad is such an example.
Launched in July 2011, the TouchPad was discontinued less than two months 
later. Remaining inventories were sold at extremely low prices to clear the stock. The 
TouchPad was made of state-of-the-art hardware specifications for that time, including 
a 1024×768–pixel touch screen, 16GB or 32GB of storage, and 1GB of memory. The 
operating system preinstalled on the TouchPad was the webOS, which suffers several 
limitations, such as very small number of available apps, compared to its competitors, 
iOS and Android. Obviously, it is to the users’ interest if a “better” operating system can 
be installed to run on the TouchPad hardware. In October 2011, the first Android-based 
jailbreak was released by CyanogenMod.i The CyanogenMod converts the TouchPad to a 
dual-boot system that supports both webOS and Android.
iCyanogenMod is a free open source operating system for smartphones and tablets, based on the 
Android mobile platform.
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In most cases, jailbreaking is made possible by exploiting design flaws or 
vulnerabilities in the firmware or software. For example, if a manufacturer’s firmware is 
not digitally signed, then it is convenient to replace it with an adversary’s firmware. Even 
if the architecture and design are sound, bugs in implementation may be exploited to 
allow jailbreaking.
Now, when the device owner is the hacker, how does the device protect itself from 
being broken? Clearly, a meaningful integrity protection scheme would have to depend 
on a root of trust that is in hardware and intact from alteration. How do Intel’s CPU and 
security and management engine help with this matter?
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 
Discussions regarding the integrity of firmware and software on a platform always involve 
trusted platform module7 (TPM). The TPM is a public standard that defines the interfaces 
of a security coprocessor. A TPM implementation is a hardware device that provides 
cryptographic functionalities for the software to invoke.
Because the TPM is hardware, it is more difficult for attackers to break its security 
and protections. Attacks against hardware are usually attempted through side channel 
analysis; for example, timing information, power consumption, and electromagnetic 
emissions. These attacks require not only physical access, but also special equipment and 
advanced skills. These requirements limit the scope of the damage of successful attacks, 
because the hardware attacks cannot be reproduced widely and easily by spreading 
viruses or malware.
Beside its hardware nature, another important feature of the TPM is its 
independence. The TPM is a module isolated from the main operating system. Its 
operations do not rely on and is not impacted by the operating system or the software 
running on it. This makes the TPM a trustworthy “third-party” for examining the integrity 
of the software stack.
TPM may be implemented as a physically discrete device or as a logical component 
inside a security coprocessor. Recent generations of Intel’s secure and management 
engine features a firmware TPM, which is used to support secure boot designs as well as 
other purposes defined in the TPM standard. For more information about the TPM on the 
embedded engine, refer to Chapter 7 of this book. Despite the existence of the firmware 
TPM, it is also possible to include a discrete TPM in the platform. Intel’s secure boot 
architecture, Intel Boot Guard, can work with either the firmware TPM or a discrete TPM.
Platform Configuration Register 
The primary goal of the TPM is to protect the integrity of the platform. As such, it is 
equipped with implementations of hash algorithms and one or more banks of platform 
configuration registers (PCRs). During the boot process, the PCRs can be used to store 
and report the hash results for every firmware and software component. The operation of 
hashing a boot component is often referred to as a measure. The operation of measuring 
the next component is often referred to as an extend, because the measurement of the 
next component is against not only the next component, but also all components that 
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have been measured before it. In other words, the measurement is always incremental. 
This is defined in the following formula:
digestnew hashA old ew: lg n= ( )H digest data
In this formula, || means concatenation and data
new
 refers to the binary data of the 
component being measured. H
hashAlg
 is the chosen hash algorithm, like SHA-256. From 
the formula, it is easy to understand that an altered component that is loaded during the 
boot process will result in incorrect or unexpected measurements for not only itself, but 
also all components loaded after it, even though those components are intact. Typically, 
the measurements are checked later locally or reported to remote servers for attestation. 
The TPM serves as secure storage only and does not perform the comparison for 
measurements.
Notice the PCR is not specific for the boot time measurement. Rather, supporting the 
integrity of boot components is just one of many usage models of the PCR. Per the TPM 
specification, the PCRs are designed for generalized representation of a platform state, 
and platform-specific specifications may define additional PCR behaviors. In general, 
a platform specification may define a PCR to represent any value that is authoritatively 
known by the TPM or has been securely communicated to the TPM.
Many secure boot architectures take advantage of the TPM’s measurement 
capability. However, the TPM has other useful ingredients in addition to the PCR, and 
the TPM is not just about protecting boot integrity. The TPM has a range of cryptographic 
capabilities, such as sealing and binding data, to help secure the platform not only during 
boot but also at runtime.
Field Programmable Fuses
Newer security and management engines shipped with select Intel platforms in and after 
2013 support a feature called field programmable fuses. As its name indicates, it allows 
fuses to be burned after leaving Intel’s manufacturing facility, in the OEM’s factory or 
in the field. The field programmable fuses are essentially another nonvolatile storage 
medium. However, it is not the only nonvolatile storage in the engine.
Field Programmable Fuses vs. Flash Storage
The security and management engine’s kernel contains a storage manager that manages 
nonvolatile data that must persist across power cycles. Nonsensitive data can be stored 
in plaintext; secrets can be protected with confidentiality, integrity, and anti-replay. The 
embedded applications that invoke the storage manager are free to apply one or more of 
these protection options for their data. The data is stored on the flash device in a special 
partition. The same flash also stores the BIOS, the embedded engine’s binary image, as 
well as other system firmware.
Now that nonvolatile data can be stored on the flash, why the field programmable 
fuses? When comparing the field programmable fuses with the flash storage, anti-replay 
becomes an interesting aspect. Two anti-replay mechanisms are supported by the 
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storage manager: native monotonic counter and RPMC (replay-protected monotonic 
counter) flash:
•	 Native monotonic counter: The monotonic counter resides in the 
chipset’s RTC (runtime clock) power well. Upon RTC power loss, 
for example, due to coin battery removal, all anti-replay blobs 
managed by the engine are invalidated by the storage manager. 
Because of this limitation, the applications must be able to  
re-create the blobs in case they are lost.
•	 RPMC flash: The flash device natively mitigates anti-replay 
attacks. The advantage is the independence of the RTC power 
well. The disadvantage is the cost of the RPMC flash. Not all OEMs 
use RPMC flash parts for all products.
The field programmable fuse scheme provides anti-replay protection that completely 
eliminates the dependency on RTC well or RPMC flash. Thanks to its nature, writing a 
fuse is a one-time operation. That is, once a fuse has been burned (its value changing 
from 0 to 1), the operation cannot be reversed, and the fuse will assume the value of 1 
from then on. This characteristic makes field programmable fuses especially suitable for 
holding data that requires certain properties:
The data must survive flash wipe or corruption. Such data includes •	
platform state information, OEM programmable confidential 
information, and so forth. The security and management engine’s 
verified boot architecture uses the field programmable fuses for 
OEMs to program digests of their public keys.
The data is used to support security claims; loss of the data may •	
result in security vulnerabilities. For example, the fuses can be 
used to permanently record the fact that a security enhancement 
feature, such as anti-theft or TPM, has been enabled for this 
platform. If an attacker (owner of the device) intends to bypass 
specific restrictions by reflashing the firmware image with 
another version that does not support the security enhancement, 
then the image replacement will be caught by the fuses.
The storage manager is not able to provide this level of protection with its anti-replay 
mechanisms.
In addition to anti-replay, the fuse block is hidden inside the security and 
management engine and invisible to the outside of the engine. In other words, 
confidentiality and integrity are native characteristics of the field programmable fuses, 
without having to apply encryption and hashing algorithms.
The main drawback of field programmable fuses is the relatively small number 
of fuses available on die. For a typical configuration of the engine, there are 1024 
programmable fuses in a 32×32 array layout. About one in every four fuses is reserved 
for locking, repairing, and redundancy check purposes, leaving only a few hundred fuses 
for applications to program. As such, the uses of the field programmable fuses are not a 
runtime matter, and must be predefined and allocated carefully on a case-by-case basis.
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Field Programmable Fuse Task
From the firmware architecture perspective, the field programmable fuse manager is 
implemented in its own task (container). See Chapter 4 of this book for more information 
about the security and management engine’s task isolation infrastructure. Being a 
dedicated task, other tasks are not able to penetrate the field programmable fuses. 
Firmware modules that own fuses can program or sense the fuses by calling the field 
programmable fuse task via the intertask calling mechanism supported by the kernel.
The flow for programming a fuse is depicted in Figure 6-2. The figure does not detail 
steps for the fuse manager to burn a fuse; for example, a valid bit check, a redundancy check, 
and so forth. The flow for sensing the value of a fuse is similar and is not shown in this figure.
Application A calls kernel for inter-
task function program_fuse(x) to
program fuse x
Kernel checks if application A









of the call from application A
Field programmable fuses
manager checks if application













manager senses fuse x












Figure 6-2. Flow for application A to programming fuse x
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Depending on the nature of the data, there are five usage models of the 
programmable fuses:
•	 Single-bit one-time programming: The data is of Boolean 
type. Once programmed, the change becomes permanent 
and it can no longer be reverted. This usage requires only one 
fuse. For example, once the OEM finishes the manufacturing 
process, it programs a single-bit one-time fuse to show that 
manufacturing is completed. Certain configurations of the 
security and management engine are intended for only OEMs to 
use; it is not supposed to be touched by end users. The firmware 
logic for handling such configurations consults this “end of 
manufacturing” indicator fuse, before proceeding with the 
configuration manipulation.
•	 Single-bit multiple-time programming: The data is of Boolean 
type. It may change a limited number of times, say n, during the 
lifetime of the platform. In this case, n fuses are necessary for 
storing the data, and one of the n fuses is programmed every 
time the value of the data flips. Take the anti-theft technology for 
example. Once enrolled, the anti-theft technology automatically 
shuts down the platform per the user-configured policy if 
it detects that the system is in a stolen state. The shutdown 
is performed only if the platform is enrolled, therefore the 
enrollment status is critical for enforcing the shutdown. Users are 
free to opt out after enrollment or enroll again (that is, changing 
the enrollment status) for a limited number of times. For a single-bit  
multiple-time programming fuse, the field programmable 
fuse manager counts the number of the n fuses that have been 
burned. If the number is odd, then the data is assumed to be true, 
implying, for example, the anti-theft is currently enrolled; if the 
number of is even or zero, then the data bit is assumed a value of 
false.
•	 Multiple-bit one-time programming: The data consists of multiple 
bits. It cannot be changed once programmed. For this usage, the 
number of fuses required is equal to the bit size of the data. For 
example, in Intel’s verified boot architecture, the OEM programs 
its 256-bit hash of OEM’s RSA public key to field programmable 
fuses during the manufacturing process. The OEM also programs 
its secure boot policies to designated fuses. Once done, the value 
cannot be erased or updated during the lifetime of the platform.
•	 Multiple-bit multiple-time programming: The data consists of 
multiple bits. It may change for a limited number of times. For 
this usage, the number of fuses required is equal to the data’s 
bit size multiplied by the number of times the data is allowed to 
change during the lifetime of the platform.
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•	 Incremental integer: The data is a non-negative integer that 
assumes values from 0 to m, inclusive. The data assumes an 
initial value of 0 and can only be updated from smaller to greater; 
for example, from 1 to 3, but not from 3 to 2. A set of m fuses 
are required for this usage model. The number of burned fuses 
represents the value of the data. A typical usage is the version 
number of a firmware component. When vulnerabilities are fixed 
in a firmware patch, the version number of the new release will 
be incremented by one from the previous vulnerable version. 
The latest version number is recorded in the fuses. When the 
embedded engine loads the firmware, it checks the firmware’s 
version number and compares with what is shown by the fuses. If 
the former is greater, the fuses are updated with the new version 
number; if the former is smaller, then the system concludes that it 
is under a rollback attack and proceeds accordingly.
Intel Boot Guard
Intel Boot Guard technology provides hardware-based boot integrity protection that 
prevents malicious firmware and software from taking over boot blocks. It does so by 
detecting an unauthorized boot block and disallowing it to execute. The Boot Guard is a 
hardware and firmware solution that does not depend on any software.
Intel released the authenticated code module, or ACM, for OEMs to enable the Intel 
Trusted Execution Technology8 (TXT) and the Boot Guard feature. As will be described 
later in detail, the ACM plays a pivotal role and carries critical tasks in the Boot Guard 
solution. Digitally signed by Intel, the ACM component is stored on the flash together 
with BIOS and other firmware components. The public key for verifying the signature on 
the ACM is hard-coded in Intel’s CPU. There is a security version number associated with 
the ACM module, which is used to identify and revoke vulnerable ACM releases and stop 
the system from booting.
To take advantage of the Boot Guard technology, the OEM must implement a new 
firmware component to the boot flow, called the initial boot block, which is loaded 
before the BIOS. The initial boot block is responsible for checking the integrity of BIOS, 
initializing memory, and loading BIOS into the system memory. Just like the ACM, the 
initial boot block is stored on the flash chip. The boot flow is shown in Figure 6-1, and the 
additions of the ACM and the initial boot block are shown in Figure 6-3.
Figure 6-3. Boot flow with ACM and initial boot block
Chapter 6 ■ Boot with integrity, or Don’t Boot 
155
Note that this is a simplified boot flow. The boot flow with the TXT is more 
complicated. Intel Boot Guard technology defines three boot configurations:
•	 Measured boot: Measures the initial boot block into the platform’s 
secure storage device, such as a TPM.
•	 Verified boot: Cryptographically verifies the integrity of the initial 
boot block using a digital signature scheme. The verified boot 
reduces material cost because it offers boot protection without a 
TPM device.
•	 Measured boot + verified boot: Measures and verifies the initial 
boot block.
But, why is it necessary to introduce the initial boot block? Why can’t the Boot Guard 
directly verify the BIOS? Here are a couple reasons.
•	 Size: The size of today’s BIOS image is in the scale of megabytes 
and increasing. However, the initial boot block is desired to be 
small enough to fit in the on-die memory of Intel silicon in all 
compatible platforms. In other words, the architecture must work 
with fixed and limited memory size. This is not scalable for a BIOS 
whose size may increase.
•	 Flexibility: Modularity in design provides flexibility and the ease 
of changing only parts of the product. Also, an OEM can use one 
private key to sign the initial boot block and another key to sign the 
BIOS. Even in the event the private key for signing the BIOS image 
is leaked or compromised, there is no need to recall hardware.
Operating System Requirements for Boot Integrity
Microsoft’s Windows Certification Program9 specifies a requirement for boot integrity. 
Intel’s Boot Guard technology helps OEMs meet this requirement for their Windows-
based systems:
Boot Integrity: Platform uses on-die ROMii or One-Time Programmable 
(OTP) memory for storing initial boot code and initial public key (or hash 
of initial public key) used to provide boot integrity, and provides power-
on reset logic to execute from on-die ROM or secure on-die SRAM.iii
Google does not pose requirements for boot integrity for Android-based systems. 
In fact, most Android device manufacturers do not implement a secure boot, and 
intentionally allow a custom operating system to be loaded.10 CyanogenMod is one of the 
most famous customized mobile operating systems derived from Android. Tutorials and 
materials for rooting Android devices are publicly available.
iiRead-only memory
iiiStatic random-access memory
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OEM Configuration
The Boot Guard configurations set by the OEM slightly vary among different products. In 
general and at a minimum, the OEM is responsible for configuring its public key hash for 
a verified boot, and the boot policies via the security and management engine.
The security of a verified boot is rooted to the OEM’s asymmetric keypair. The OEM 
generates a 2048-bit RSA keypair as its root key for signing manifests for the initial boot 
blocks. The private portion of the root keypair must be kept securely, and signing manifests 
for initial boot blocks shall be its sole usage. On the other hand, the SHA-256 hash of the 
public key is programmed to the field programmable fuses during the manufacturing 
process. The public key hash consumes 256 fuses that belong to the multiple-bit one-time 
programming category, which cannot be updated once written. Because of the one-time 
programming limitation, the OEM will not be able to renew the root key or update the 
hash, even if the private key is compromised. Therefore, the OEM must protect its root 
private key in a signing server with strong protection from attacks or leakage.
In addition to programming its public key hash, the OEM is also responsible for 
defining its boot policies and saving them in the field programmable fuses. The boot 
policies are also a one-time configuration that cannot be revised. The policies instruct the 
Intel hardware with regard to the following:
What boot protections are enabled—that is, measured boot only, •	
verified boot only, neither, or both
What actions to take upon ACM failure•	
What action to take upon initial boot block failure•	
In the scenario that the CPU is unable to load the ACM from the flash or the digital 
signature of the ACM fails to verify, the CPU may either (based on the OEM’s setting for 
the second bullet in the preceding list) enter the shutdown state or proceed with booting 
from the legacy vector. Although the instant shutdown option offers the highest level of 
integrity protection, it is generally not recommended because it may potentially lead to a 
large number of customer support calls. And problems are extremely difficult to debug if 
the system powers itself off at a very early stage of the boot process.
After the ACM is checked out successfully, the initial boot block becomes the 
next subject of interest. Recall that the security and management engine is capable 
of triggering instant shutdown of the platform (see Chapter 4 for details). When a 
boot integrity-check fails, it is the engine’s responsibility—according to the OEM’s set 
policies—to shut down the platform and terminate the boot process. The OEM can 
determine when the shutdown should happen upon failure. A few options are available:
•	 Unrestricted: Do not shut down the system; let it boot and run 
normally as if the failure did not occur.
•	 Remediation: Let the system continue to boot but shutdown 
ungracefully after a certain amount of time. The amount of 
time (for example, 30 minutes) should be enough for a repair 
technician to perform basic remediation work, such as updating 
the initial boot block or BIOS from the operating system. Yet, the 
time before shutdown should not be too long; otherwise, the boot 
policy becomes meaningless.
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•	 Diagnostics: This is similar to the remediation option, but the 
timer is set to a much smaller value, such as one minute. This 
option allows the manufacturer’s support engineers to retrieve 
debug information from the system.
•	 Zero-tolerance: Shut down the platform immediately upon a boot 
integrity failure. Similar to the case of ACM failure, this option is 
generally not recommended.
The security and management engine offers two methods for the OEM to program its 
public key hash and the boot policies to the designated field programmable fuses. In both 
cases, the configuration is allowed only before the end of the manufacturing process:
 1. Through HECIiv commands sent from the host operating 
system. The commands are honored by the engine only before 
the “end of manufacturing” HECI message is received and 
recorded. This method is not available for production parts.
 2. Through image building. Intel provides OEMs with a software 
program called firmware image tool to build a flash image from 
various components, such as binaries of BIOS, the security and 
management engine, and so on. The tool allows an OEM to 
configure the engine for Boot Guard support, including setting 
its public key hash and boot polices. These values will be 
automatically programmed to the field programmable fuses by 
the engine’s firmware as soon as the “end of manufacturing” 
HECI message is received and recorded.
The boot policy configuration applies to both the measured boot and verified boot.
Measured Boot
The measured boot mechanism is made possible by the Intel TXT. The Intel TXT is 
designed to harden platforms at the hardware level, from hypervisor, firmware (BIOS, root 
kit, and so forth), and other software-based attacks.
The Windows Certification Program requires measuring all boot components using 
a TPM. Intel’s measured boot meets this requirement because the initial boot block is 
measured as the first boot component:
During the boot sequence, the boot firmware/software shall measure all 
firmware and all software components it loads after the core root of trust 
for measurement is established. The measurements shall be logged as well 
as extended to platform configuration registers in a manner compliant 
with the following requirements.
ivHECI, or host-embedded communication interface, is the two-way communication channel 
between the security and management engine and the host operating system. Refer to Chapter 3 for 
more information about the HECI.
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The Intel TXT works by creating a measured launched environment (MLE), which 
enables precise comparisons between the current state of the platform and known-good  
references for all components of the boot process. The measurements (extended hashes 
of components) are stored in the platform’s secure storage device, usually a TPM, and 
are available for local or remote attestation. If measurements match known-good 
configurations, then the TXT marks the system trusted; otherwise, the TXT marks the 
system untrusted and follows defined fallback policies. It can either abort the boot 
process or let the platform continue to operate—but with degraded functionality, such as 
forbidding it from running sensitive tasks, for example.
For the measured boot, the CPU loads the ACM after verifying the signature associated 
with it. The ACM calculates the hash of the initial boot block and stores the measurement  
in a PCR slot of the platform’s discrete or firmware TPM device. The measurement is 
available for attestation later.
Verified Boot
The measured boot mechanism relies on a dedicated storage device, typically PCR slots 
of a TPM, to securely store measurements of the initial boot block and other components 
involved in the boot process. Unfortunately, a TPM may not be available on all form 
factors. This is especially the case for low-cost mobile devices. Specifically, for systems 
in which TPM is not required for other functionalities, adding a TPM merely for the 
purpose of safeguarding the boot integrity increases not only the BOM (bill of materials) 
cost but also development and integration effort, which may not yield a good return-
on-investment. However, the boot integrity can still be a critical requirement for those 
devices. The verified boot mechanism provides an alternate approach without relying 
on a TPM or other devices. Notice that the verified boot mechanism by itself does not 
measure all boot components. Therefore, without a measured boot, it may not satisfy the 
Windows Certification Program requirements.
Cryptographically, data integrity is achieved by employing either a hash (including 
a keyed hash and a plain hash) or a digital signature as a “measurement.” Without an 
independent and trusted reference, the “known good” measurement must be kept 
within the platform and intact from unauthorized alteration. The verified boot features 
a hardware-based root of trust for verifying the integrity of the initial boot block. Next, 
the initial boot block verifies the integrity of the BIOS, the BIOS verifies the integrity of 
the boot loader, and the boot loader verifies the integrity of the operating system, and so 
forth. The integrity of successive components loaded following the initial boot block is 
guaranteed by a chain of trust.
Manifests
The initial boot block binary is associated with a manifest, called the initial boot block 
manifest, or IBBM for short. The IBBM contains the following fields:
 1. The security version number of the IBBM
 2. The SHA-256 hash of the initial boot block
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 3. The RSA signature on (1) and (2)
 4. The RSA public key that is used to verify (3), referred to as the 
IBBM public key onward
The IBBM 2048-bit RSA keypair is also generated by the OEM, but it is different 
from the OEM root RSA keypair introduced earlier; although an OEM is free (but not 
encouraged) to utilize the same keypair for both. The only usage of the IBBM RSA keypair 
is to sign IBBMs. The IBBM RSA private key must be kept securely by the OEM. The OEM 
root public key hash is stored in the security and management engine’s programmable 
fuses. In contrast, the IBBM public key appears only in the IBBM.
The IBBM is not the only manifest in the picture. The OEM uses its root keypair to 
sign another manifest, namely the key manifest, which contains the following fields:
 5. The security version number of the key manifest
 6. The SHA-256 hash of the IBBM public key
 7. The RSA signature on the (5) and (6)
 8. The OEM root public key, used to verify (7)
The hash of the OEM root public key (8) is stored in the programmable fuses. Both 
the IBBM and the key manifest are stored on the flash. The relationships among the root 
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Figure 6-4. Using the OEM public key hash to verify the initial boot block via the key 
manifest and IBBM
As Figure 6-4 depicts, the root of trust is the OEM root public key hash located in 
the fuse hardware and handled by the security and management engine. This makes the 
verified boot a hardware-based scheme that is significantly more difficult to compromise 
than software solutions.
The key manifest seems an unnecessary middleman sitting between the OEM root 
public key hash and the IBBM. Why not just use the OEM root key to sign the IBBM 
directly? The indirection introduced by the key manifest is desirable for OEMs that 
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manufacture multiple product lines. With the key manifest, the OEM can use a single root 
key for all its products, but different IBBM keys for different product lines.
For the sake of revocation, both manifests are versioned.
The security version number of the key manifest enables the •	
OEM to revoke the IBBM keypair should it be compromised. If 
the IBBM keypair must be replaced, then the OEM will generate 
a new IBBM keypair and place its public key hash in a new key 
manifest, and at the same time increment the security version 
number of the key manifest.
The security version number of the IBBM covers the initial boot •	
block, and it allows the OEM to revoke and patch a vulnerable initial 
boot block. When a new initial boot block is released, the security 
version number of the IBBM must be incremented accordingly.
The two version numbers are examined by the security and management engine 
during the verified boot process. If the engine finds that the version number of a manifest 
being loaded is greater than the corresponding value recorded in the field programmable 
fuses, then it programs a certain number of fuses to reflect the greater version number. 
The fuses reserved for the security version numbers belong to the category of incremental 
integer. The version number of a manifest being loaded being smaller than the 
corresponding value recorded in the fuses is an indicator of a rollback attack, where 
an attacker unlocks the flash part and replaces a good and later version of the manifest 
with a vulnerable and older version. In this situation, the embedded engine will react 
accordingly per the boot policies in the fuses configured by the OEM.
Admittedly, revocation relying on security version numbers has its limitations. The 
mechanism works only if the platform has already run, at least once, a later manifest or 
an initial boot block with a greater version number, and then the manifest or initial boot 
block is rolled back to an earlier and vulnerable version. If the attacker blocks manifest 
or initial boot block updates (this is rather trivial to do) in the first place, so the platform 
has no chance to ever see the patched manifest or initial boot block, then the revocation 
design backed by security versioning will not be able to protect the platform. To make the 
situation worse, an advanced attacker may reverse-engineer the new initial boot block 
release and figure out the security bugs that were fixed, and attempt to exploit the bugs in 
the old initial boot block.
Verification Flow
The verification of the initial boot block is a collaborative effort by the security and 
management engine and the ACM running on the CPU. The ACM is responsible for the 
following:
Loading the initial boot block firmware and the two manifests •	
from the flash
Retrieving the OEM’s public key hash, boot policy, its own •	
security version number, and the security version numbers of the 
two manifests from the engine
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Verifying the integrity of the initial boot block using the manifests •	
and OEM’s public key hash
Notifying the engine of updating the security version numbers if •	
necessary
Enforcing boot policy in the event of a communication error or a •	
time-out with the engine
The security and management engine is responsible for the following:
Reading OEM’s public key hash, boot policy, ACM security •	
version number, and the security version numbers of the two 
manifests from field programmable fuses, and sends to the ACM
Incrementing security version numbers of the ACM and the two •	
manifests in the fuses upon requests from the ACM
Enforcing boot policies in the event of a communication error or •	
time-out with the ACM
Performing appropriate actions upon failure of verification, per •	
the boot policies
Figure 6-5 presents the high-level sequence diagram. In the figure, the security 
version number check performed by the ACM is against three elements: the ACM, the 
key manifest, and the IBBM. For the boot process to succeed, all three values seen by the 
ACM must be equal to or greater than the respectively referenced values reported by the 
security and management engine. If one or more of the security version numbers need 
updating, then the ACM notifies the engine after all checks have passed.
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Figure 6-5. The initial boot block verification flow for the verified boot
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